Is Agent Causation the Means to Genuine Free Will?

The focus of this article is an assessment of whether Timothy O’Connor successfully developed a viable alternative (agent causation) to the mechanistic paradigm of free will. The basis of this discussion is his writing, “The Agent as Cause.” Ultimately, the dialogue will conclude with an assessment of whether O’Connor’s alternative paradigm of agent causation can give us genuine free will.

Agent Causation: A Viable Alternative to the Mechanistic Paradigm?

In his paper, O’Connor makes a number of important points in support of why agent causation is a viable alternative to mechanistic causation. The first point is the impact of “prior desires, intentions, and beliefs” (reasons) on the effect produced in agent causation. O’Connor suggests that the intention is the guiding reason for the production of the agent’s effect, and that the intention is sustained throughout the completion of the act.

Critics have suggested that this explanation of reasons is unacceptable because “undetermined instances of agent causation would be random,” thereby leading critics to request a mechanistic explanation for how agent’s control the “device” that guides their decision-making processes. O’Connor points out that it does not make sense for an agent to need a mechanism to control their control mechanism, because wouldn’t they then require another mechanism to control that control mechanism and so on? He further answers this objection by explaining that the intention to act in accordance with certain reasons is what directly controls the agent’s decision-making process.

Another point that O’Connor makes in support of agent causation is related to the objection that reasons as an explanation of free actions is insufficient because these reasons won’t explain why the agent chose that act rather than one of the alternatives. O’Connor answers this objection by asserting that we need not know why an event occurred (as opposed to an alternative), but rather only what occurred and that it occurred rather than a viable alternative.

Problem With the Mechanistic Paradigm of Free Will

The issue with the mechanistic paradigm as it relates to free will is in the assertion that the effects are actually caused by these intrinsic properties of the object, as opposed to being caused by the agent. Consequently, how can an agent be said to have free will if they had no part in the determination of the effect? By shifting the control to the agent, who determines the effect from a range of possibilities based on the intrinsic properties of the agent, free will is made possible. Therefore, O’Connor’s explanation of agent causation is a viable alternative to mechanistic causation.

Is Agent Causation the Means to Genuine Free Will?

While O’Connor admits that his assertions don’t explain all of the open questions left by the agent causation theory, he does identify two areas that need to be investigated further in order to have agent causation satisfactorily provide genuine free will. First, we need to account for how reasons move us to act in the way we do. Second, we need to acknowledge that reasons don’t carry the same level of importance to us. O’Connor notes that these missing explanations are the “biggest obstacles to a clear understanding of what free will requires.”

Given Timothy O’Connor’s explanations, agent causation seems to be the key to establishing genuine free will, despite the fact that the explanation is incomplete by his own admission. Free will has a basic requirement of the agent being the ultimate decision-maker in their actions. If the agent’s actions are determined by some force or event outside of the agent, then that agent cannot be said to have free will. Furthermore, intentions are indeed the reason-guiding motivations behind our actions. At the most fundamental level, we do what we do because after deliberation, we have decided that the reason for that act has outweighed the reasons for alternatives. Consequently, we must conclude that that agent causation captures the essence of free will.

Sources:

O’Connor, Timothy. “The Agent as Cause.” In Robert Kane, ed. Free Will (2002). Malden, MA Blackwell Publishing.

Stanford University. “Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will”